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The main aim of this paper is to analyse the singularity of the case of Spain in the 
coverage of the risk of sickness within the context of the different welfare models 
described in international literature. This analysis enables us to verify that in Spain, as 
in other countries, there were initially different forms of sickness coverage which 
coexisted, created by the market, by the workers themselves and, gradually, by the state. 
Within the so-called mixed economy of welfare, the most extensive health coverage for 
the Spanish population was a result of the self-organization of workers, and this 
continued up until the Civil War (1936-1939), not so much due to its efficacy and 
viability as to the slow development of private insurance companies and the incapacity 
of the state to implement a compulsory sickness insurance. The installation of the 
Franco dictatorship meant that the introduction of compulsory sickness insurance was 
further delayed, and when it was eventually passed it offered only a limited coverage, 
was enacted more for political than for social ends, and was to entail the virtual 
disappearance of the friendly societies. 
 
 
From a historical point of view, the advent of industrialisation entailed the 
application of new technologies and the emergence of business opportunities, processes 
which existed side by side with an industrial proletariat subject to harsh working and 
living conditions.1 Besides the problems of over-crowding, hygiene and sanitation, 
workers had to fight against the economic insecurity stemming from sickness, old age, 
industrial accidents or unemployment, any of which could prevent them from earning a 
wage, their only source of survival.2  During these early stages, the coverage of social 
risks came from four basic sectors: the state, the market, private companies and 
solidarity among workers. However, we also find insurance mutuals promoted by 
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workers or employers, trade union activity and, of course, family networks which 
offered complementary solutions to the economic uncertainties deriving from the 
capitalist system. The scenario depicted above could represent what some authors have 
termed “the mixed economy of welfare”.3 
In the nineteenth century, the process of industrialisation in Spain progressed much 
more slowly than in other European countries. Various causes have been recorded 
which help explain Spain’s “relative backwardness”, most notably the backwardness in 
agriculture, the lack of resources accumulated through taxation, the insufficient 
intellectual and technical preparation of the population, the loss of the last colonial 
territories in the war of  1898 and the lack of incentives to compete within a 
protectionist framework.4 Far from being isolated issues, it is the sum of all these 
factors that helps understand the complexity of Spain’s backwardness at the start of the 
twentieth century. This backwardness was also reflected in the late maturity of the 
country’s socio-political structures, which delayed the intervention of Spanish 
governments in social issues. Within this context, the Spanish liberal state offered 
workers two rather unsatisfactory options for dealing with social risks: personal savings 
and charity. But saving proved to be a basically unviable option for workers’ tight 
household budgets at the start of industrialisation, even when none of the family 
members were out of work.5  The situation became even worse when the frequent 
appearance of sickness or unemployment ended up undermining the fragile financial 
equilibrium of workers’ homes.  As far as charity was concerned, this was only 
provided for families registered in the census of the poor. Generally speaking, charity 
could not count on many public resources and depended, rather, on the goodwill of 
private donors.6 The rest of the population were denied access to hospital care and 
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charity and depended on pecuniary medical benefits. Under such conditions, workers 
suffering from long-term illnesses fell into a state of exclusion and marginality, giving 
rise to new categories of poverty for which the traditional cliché of vagrants and crooks 
now no longer served.7 
The poor conditions in terms of diet and hygiene and the difficulties in gaining 
access to medical and pharmaceutical services made the sickness-poverty-death link one 
of the main fears of the nineteenth-century urban working classes.8  In spite of social 
fears, governments did not start to legislate sickness insurance until the end of the 
nineteenth century.  During a good part of this century, private insurance companies 
also failed to satisfy the demand of working class families for health care, as in most 
countries. This was, first of all, because their premiums were in many cases beyond the 
reach of the financial means of wage-earners, or because the sector was very little 
developed. Further contributory factors were the cases of bankruptcy associated with 
the financial crises of the period and the lack of clarity of the existing legislative 
framework, which led to a lack of confidence in commercial insurance companies 
among the population.9  Within this context, workers looked for responses to the social 
failings of the market through formulas of solidarity and greater autonomy.10  Through 
the creation of non-profit making voluntary associations, the insured, who acted at the 
same time as insurers and administrators, received aid from common funds in the 
situations of risk established in their statutes. 
In Spain’s case, a state welfare system started to take shape in the early twentieth 
century with the establishment of old age, maternity and industrial accident insurances. 
Given this situation, a sickness insurance just seemed to be a matter of time. However, 
its approval was delayed until the 1940s, making Spain one of the last European 
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countries to have compulsory sickness insurance. Consequently, the lifespan of the so-
called mixed economy of welfare in the area of health coverage was longer in Spain and 
lasted later, at least until the Civil War (1936-1939). Within the mixed economy of 
welfare, the most extensive health coverage for the Spanish population was a result of 
the self-organization of workers, and this continued up until the Civil War, not so much 
due to its efficacy and viability as to the slow development of private insurance 
companies and the incapacity of the state to implement a compulsory sickness 
insurance. Meanwhile, on an international level, the coverage of the risk of sickness 
evolved, in the long term, towards two basic models.11  One was that which is now in 
force in the majority of Western European countries, where the compulsory state system 
took on a dominant role in the medium term. The other is that championed by the 
United States, based on voluntarism and the free functioning of the market. Recent 
research into social and economic history has suggested that, while in Europe the 
alternative networks of voluntary cover collapsed, which made the compulsory state 
system necessary, in the United States the social demand for a public system was 
mitigated by the relatively good functioning and widespread coverage of industrial 
sickness funds.  
Finally, the Spanish seguro obligatorio de enfermedad (compulsory sickness 
insurance or SOE) was introduced in 1942, under the influence of the fascist ideology of 
the Falange, one of the political families comprising the Franco dictatorship, and it was 
far removed from the Beveridge Plan which had inspired a good part of the state welfare 
systems in Europe. Within this political context, state health coverage in Spain had 
some peculiar characteristics. On the one hand, the compulsory sickness insurance 
started up with serious organisational and financial difficulties, as it did not receive state 
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financing but rather depended on the contributions of employers and workers. On the 
other hand, the Francoist state health care system completely ignored the work carried 
out by friendly societies in the field of health care, which effectively led to their virtual 
disappearance. 
Taking the above as a starting point, this paper poses the following objectives. On the 
one hand, it intends to analyse the evolution of sickness risk coverage in Spain from 
1880 to 1944. On the other hand, it intends to analyse the factors which conditioned the 
“peculiarity” of the case of Spain with respect to the two models of health care coverage 
normally established in the pertinent literature. In other words, why did the mixed 
economy of welfare remain in force for so long in Spain in the field of health care 
coverage? Was it due to the viability of voluntary systems or due to the absence of the 
social state? In order to deal with these questions, the paper is organised as follows. The 
first section analyses the mixed economy of welfare in Spain before the Spanish Civil 
War. During this period, the state did not manage to meet workers’ needs with regard to 
health care coverage. Neither the restructuring of public charity nor the state’s tentative 
and exiguous intervention in matters of social insurance were sufficient. Private 
insurance companies also failed to meet these needs due to their limited capital, uneven 
geographical concentration and scant actuarial development. Within this context, the 
formula of friendly societies was the one to achieve greatest development and 
geographical extension and enabled, on the basis of solidarity, greater sickness coverage 
for a good many Spanish workers bereft of other possibilities of coverage in the face of 
social risks. For this reason, the second section of this paper focuses on social protection 
against sickness through mutual solidarity before the Civil War. Friendly societies 
provided medical and pharmaceutical coverage and, at times, coverage of certain 
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specialities such as surgery, maternity or dentistry from 1880 until the military coup of 
1936 which degenerated into civil war. The triumph of the rebels and the establishment 
of the Franco dictatorship led to the appearance of a new fascist-influenced social policy 
which modified the state’s role in terms of social coverage and established a system of 
social insurances far removed from those in force in other Western European countries. 
The third section analyses the process of introducing compulsory sickness insurance 
under the Franco dictatorship, the characteristics of this insurance and the parallel 
disappearance of the friendly societies in Spain. The final section sets forth the main 
conclusions.   
 
MIXED ECONOMY OF WELFARE IN SPAIN BEFORE THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936-39) 
As in other capitalist countries, at the beginning of Spain’s industrialisation in the 
nineteenth century, sickness risk coverage came from four basic sectors: the state, the 
market, private companies and solidarity among workers.12 However, in Spain prior to 
the Civil War, both the state and the market played a very weak role, unlike other 
European states or the private insurance market in the United States, and this 
consequently obliged the friendly societies to assume a more active role, despite their 
limited effectiveness and their insufficient coverage. In the following paragraphs we 
will analyse the factors which caused the tardiness of state intervention and the apathy 
of the market, aspects which were to justify, to a large extent, the continued survival of 
the friendly societies.  
With respect to the state, during the nineteenth century the liberal state in Spain 
had undertaken a reorganisation of charity by concentrating it specifically on those who 
were included in the census of the poor, with the rest of the population having no 
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entitlement to public health care. In 1883 the Commission for Social Reform was 
created in Spain, charged with the responsibility for studying social problems and 
drawing up bills in order to submit them for debate in the Cortes (Spanish parliament).13 
However, these studies did not result in any specific legal provisions and successive 
governments continued to adopt a passive role with respect to social intervention. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century there was still a great controversy in Spain about 
what role the state should play in social welfare. The debate gave rise to two opposing 
tendencies: those who were in favour of state intervention and those who rejected the 
need for social legislation and even denied the existence of the social question, arguing 
that it was simply a collection of individual conflicts. The first welfare model to be 
applied took place in a context of political instability, a high cost of living, 
unemployment and growing social protests by workers. Two institutions played a key 
role in this change of policy: the Institute for Social Reform (Instituto de Reformas 
Sociales or IRS) and the National Welfare Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión or 
INP).14 The former, created by Royal Decree on 23 April 1903, was formed with the 
aim of preparing work-related legislation in the widest sense, monitoring its 
implementation by organising the necessary inspection and statistical services, and 
favouring social and governmental action aimed at bringing about improved conditions 
or welfare for the working classes. In reality, the Institute for Social Reform became the 
driving force behind work-related legislation and opened the way to the progressive 
incorporation of Spain into the European framework in this field. Meanwhile, with the 
passage of the Law of 27 February 1908, the National Welfare Institute was created, 
which signified the real start of state intervention in the area of social insurances. From 
the very beginning there was an attempt to give the National Welfare Institute total 
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autonomy to save it from the vicissitudes of politics. For this reason, it was created as a 
distinct administrative entity with its own funds, independent of the state, with which to 
run all the administration related to social welfare. The creation of these two bodies 
highlighted a change in state policy behind which lay a change of mentality in the 
political and social structures of the country, as charity (through which only scant 
results had been obtained) stopped being given priority, giving way to social assistance. 
The first state intervention in terms of social insurance was not until 1900 when 
a law of industrial accidents was passed, which authorised voluntary insurance, and then 
in 1919 when the first compulsory pension insurance was launched. Intervention in the 
issue of health care did not come until much later. Maternity insurance was not 
approved until 1929. State provision of public health care on a national scale remained 
unchanged throughout the entire nineteenth century and then up until the Spanish Civil 
War, although meanwhile the provisions of other public authorities increased, basically 
at a provincial and, above all, municipal level. Until the Second Republic (1931-1936), 
public health care was dispersed in various partial objectives (the fight against infant 
mortality, tuberculosis and venereal diseases and the provision of specialised 
sanatoriums under the responsibility of different institutions). The public health care 
infrastructure was consequently uncoordinated and focussed on the poor or on specific 
targets, especially contagious diseases, and did not attend to the everyday healthcare 
needs of the population.15 
During the transforming first two years of the Second Republic, from 1931 to 
1933, there was nevertheless a notable change of policy as professionals and 
intellectuals were incorporated into the government, and who tried to crystallise a health 
care reform in Spain. One of the clearest symptoms of this attempt was the increase in 
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the budget allocated to the Directorate General for Health Care (Dirección General de 
Sanidad) which almost tripled in three years, from 9.9 million pesetas in 1931 to 31 
million in 1933.  The attempts to introduce a compulsory sickness insurance in this 
context did not originate so much from the effects of the prevailing economic crisis but 
rather from the incorporation of politicians open to a health care reform. However, they 
could not put their plans into practice due to their high cost, considerable organisational 
difficulties and the opposition of important pressure groups including, above all, doctors 
and employers.16 In the elections of November 1933 the conservative parties grouped 
within the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA) came to power, 
initiating the period known as the Republican “black biennium” (1933-1935). One of 
their main concerns was to dismantle the preceding body of reforms which they 
considered to be, in social and religious terms, pernicious to Spain’s interests.17  
Although advances were made in social policy during the Republican period (1931-
1936), above all during the first two years of progressive government, sickess insurance 
continued to be an unresolved issue, as a whole series of factors persisted which 
hindered its effective implementation. The most serious of these obstacles was the lack 
of modernisation of the fiscal system which made it difficult for the state to increase its 
income through direct taxation. This, consequently, impeded the creation of the 
infrastructure necessary to apply sickness insurance to the entire population. On the 
other hand, the opposition of the majority of employers, doctors’ professional 
associations, mutuals and insurance companies, who felt their private business interests 
to be at risk, continued. Even workers showed themselves to be unwilling to accept an 
insurance based on contributions, as they were hoping for greater state coverage without 
having to make contributions, as was the case with old age pensions.18  
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In spite of all the problems, the socialist Minister of Labour, Largo Caballero, tried to 
get a project for sickness insurance underway during the first two years of the Republic.  
The bureaucratic process became drawn out as the political make-up of the government 
changed during the second two-year period of the Republic. Finally, the project was 
presented at the beginning of 1936, under a new progressive government, but now 
included in a wider project intended to bring about the unification of all different types 
of social insurance. The main objective was to incorporate Spain into the European 
trend which advocated an integrated and universal insurance. The outbreak of the Civil 
War, however, prevented the passage of this legislation.19 
 With respect to the market, unlike countries such as the United States, where 
insurance companies substituted sickness funds when these went into crisis, the private 
offer in Spain was very exiguous, with many small companies with scant capital 
providing cover within a very limited geographical area, and mainly concentrated in 
Catalonia.20 The new law of private insurance of May 1908 exempted friendly societies 
without a fixed subscription which only operated on a local, municipal or provincial 
scale. This exception allowed them to continue operating without the requirement of 
deposits or reserves. In 1914 this exemption was conceded to 438 friendly societies in 
case of sickness, rising to 443 in 1915. Within this group, there were 207 and 229 
mutuals, respectively, which provided aid in the case of death, as well as in the case of 
sickness.21 Likewise, the law of private insurance established that insurers which 
covered the cost of funerals, in exchange for fixed periodical fees, were also exempted 
from the law. Only those which provided actual sickness insurance, that is, a provision 
of medical-pharmaceutical attention and a sickness benefit for the head of the family, 
had to enrol in the register of the private insurance law. The majority of registered 
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institutions which operated on the market in the branch of sickness insurance were, 
therefore, medical-pharmaceutical igualatorios (doctors’ associations) or specialised 
medical centres located in Barcelona or in the region of Catalonia, whereas in the rest of 
Spain insurers were largely dedicated to providing funeral insurance. 
 The number of institutions registered as authorised bodies in the sickness branch 
was far less than the number of those exempted, in spite of the fact that the requirements 
for deposits and reserves were low compared with other branches. In 1912, there were 
only 32 companies operating in sickness and death insurance, all of them Spanish. The 
top five companies together accounted for 68 per cent of premiums. The number of 
companies rose until it reached 75 in 1935 (Figure 1). The effect on the market, which 
was already fragmented, was a reduction in the concentration of premiums. While in 
1912 the top five companies concentrated 68 per cent of premiums in this branch, by 
1920 this figure was down to 49 per cent, by 1930 it was 33 per cent and after the Civil 





The source does not furnish information about the number of policies or insured but, 
nevertheless, simply by observing premiums the minimal role which the sickness 
branch played in the business of private insurance is evident. It can also be seen that 
rather than increasing its weight with time, this actually diminished. During the entire 
period from 1912 to 1940, the premiums of the sickness branch never exceeded 6 per 
cent of the total premiums of all the branches comprising private insurance. With the 
passing of the years its weight gradually declined until it was a mere 2.85 per cent in 
1935 (see Table 1). There was only a minimal growth in premiums during the 1930s, 
after the disappearance of the sole traders of the sector.  










Sickness premiums as % of 
premiums of private insurance 
sector 
1912 6,035,248 55.6 116,404,793 5.18 
1913 7,040,648 64.8 128,990,883 5.45 
1914 7,777,412 71.6 130,022,459 5.98 
1915 8,400,608 77.4 138,084,761 6.08 
1916 8,138,463 75 135,754,263 5.99 
1917 7,749,124 71.4 129,074,229 6.00 
1918 7,362,876 67.8 128,409,083 5.73 
1919 6,717,837 61.9 129,207,297 5.19 
1920 6,924,477 63.8 135,120,025 5.12 
1921 7,921,222 73 173,796,842 4.55 
1922 9,025,913 83.1 179,430,072 5.03 
1923 9,472,512 87.3 185,347,468 5.11 
1924 10,038,525 92.5 200,048,002 5.01 
1925 10,461,865 96.4 210,108,564 4.97 
1926 8,565,239 78.9 225,811,039 3.79 
1927 8,940,369 82.4 233,160,016 3.83 
1928 10,849,758 100 261,798,679 4.14 
1929 12,346,784 113.7 302,793,081 4.07 
1930 13,826,690 127.4 323,756,052 4.27 
1931 14,262,450 131.4 336,510,017 4.23 
1932 11,307,900 104.2 351,684,561 3.21 
1933 12,621,042 116.3 412,900,498 3.05 
1934 11,002,996 101.4 418,199,950 2.63 
1935 12,297,390 113.3 428,251,722 2.87 
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1937* 961,859 8.8 112,851,052 0.85 
1938 10,575,259 97.4 211,031,420 5.01 
1939 6,018,926 55.4 240,970,671 2.49 
1940 7,302,478 67.3 356,543,117 2.04 
Source: Boletín Oficial de Seguros (1913-1926); Boletín Oficial de la Inspección Mercantil y de Seguros (1927-
1928); Revista de Previsión (1929-1934); Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro (1934-1941); Anuario Estadístico 
de España (1919). We have data for 1936 but only very partial. In 1937 only the premiums for the part of Spain 
controlled by the Nationalists are taken into account. 
 
This stagnation of premiums may demonstrate that, despite the slowness of the 
process of the state adopting sickness insurance, the alternative was not to come from a 
market which remained apathetic and lacking in dynamism throughout the entire period 
prior to the Civil War. The majority of companies were small-scale, with a reduced 
geographical area of operations, with little capital and run by professional doctors and 
non-professionals from the insurance sector. In contrast to countries like the United 
States, where insurance companies substituted mutual sickness funds, Spanish insurance 
companies did not have this capacity. Two factors could explain this incapacity. One of 
these was the backwardness of actuarial techniques.23 The other was the exiguous 
demands for capital, reserves and deposits in the sickness branch which did not favour 
either the capitalisation of these companies or their concentration.24 At the same time, 
both friendly societies and commercial companies offering health care coverage on the 
market concentrated their services in urban areas. In rural areas, health care remained 
linked to the doctors who had established practices in these areas. These doctors, 
besides taking responsibility for the medical attention of those included in the census of 
the poor, also offered private cover to the rest of the population in return for payment by 
means of a system of agreed retainer fees (known as igualas). This service, however, 
did not include any pecuniary compensation and was lacking in medical attention in 
medical-surgical specialities.25 
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Apart from private insurance companies, there were other alternatives offered by 
employers and, above all, by large companies. Large companies, however, were hardly 
the norm in Spain, whereas small workshops and family concerns were much more 
common, and for this reason the health coverage paid for by the company usually only 
benefited a small number of workers. Only in some industrial zones, with a certain 
concentration of medium-sized and small companies, did workers manage to obtain an 
employer’s contribution to the cost of the sickness coverage, thanks to the strength of 
the trade unions. Similarly, the workers of large companies managed to get their 
employers to offer them higher benefits than those provided by the state.26 During the 
1920s, the electricity companies in Madrid created a medical-pharmaceutical mutual 
society for its members. In Bilbao, the iron and steel companies and the paper company 
Papelera Española did likewise. Meanwhile, among textile manufacturers in some parts 
of Calalonia such as Sabadell and Mataró, employers provided maternity benefits that 
were higher than those offered by the state, and which allowed women working in the 
sector to accumulate both benefits.27 However, this type of solution proved to be limited 
due to the generally small scale of companies in Spain prior to the Civil War. For the 
most part, workshops still tended to predominate over factories at this time, and 
traditional methods of craftsmanship were still common in the productive process.28 On 
many occasions employers’ contributions were made through friendly societies. At 
times, therefore, solidarity among workers and the contribution of employers actually 
complemented each other.  
In fact, until 1939, the cover provided by friendly societies was still the most viable 
system for Spanish workers, given that neither the market nor the state offered realistic 
alternatives. In the following section we will concentrate our analysis on the 
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development, scale and characteristics of the friendly societies as the only viable 
alternative for the majority of Spanish workers, apart from private charity or the 
stygmatising public charity. 
 
SOCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST SICKNESS THROUGH MUTUAL SOLIDARITY PRIOR TO THE 
SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
Mutual aid against the contingencies of life or sickness has a long historical tradition, 
from the confraternities or brotherhoods of medieval origin through to the networks of 
guilds typical of the Old Regime.29 Under the new rules of capitalism, protection based 
on solidarity took on a new lease of life in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
both in Europe and in America, where basic common traits can be found within a reality 
full of nuances. Its progression responded basically to a growing need of workers to be 
insured against the social risks which accompanied industrial development in a context 
characterised by market shortcomings and the passivity of the state in the field of social 
welfare.  
After having overcome a first stage marked by mistrust, the majority of European 
states such as England, France or Italy established legal frameworks to regulate the 
activities of friendly societies which contributed to their development.30 However, in 
other countries such as Spain, relations between friendly societies and the state were 
incapable of overcoming historical suspicion and mistrust.31 The Spanish authorities 
feared that friendly societies could serve as a front for the labour movement, considered 
to be a threat to the success of the liberal project. Institutional fears and suspicions led 
to very strict measures of inspection and control which clashed with the unwillingness 
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of workers’ associations to furnish information, employed as a defensive strategy in 
hostile circumstances.  
In spite of the difficulties, the phenomenon of mutual benefit societies became 
widespread in Spain. Generally speaking, these were associations funded autonomously 
by the workers on their own initiative, although some were also to be found sponsored 
by patrons and supporting members, and had the coverage of the risk of sickness or 
death as their main aim. 32 Very few workers’ friendly societies had sufficient financial 
capacity to cover old age or permanent disability, risks that demanded a significant 
expenditure during a prolonged period of time. Furthermore, situations which derived 
from misconduct (drunkenness, venereal diseases, fights, etc.), catastrophes and 
epidemics were always excluded from the coverage provided by friendly societies. The 
administration of these societies was the responsibility of the members themselves, who 
took it in turns to be members of the board of directors. The lack of professionalism in 
this area led to methods based on empiricism and lacking in actuarial rigour. These 
organisations never used actuarial methods, nor did they set their premiums on the basis 
of mortality tables which, nevertheless, were used by insurance companies for their life 
policies. In most cases a general subscription fee was established for all members, both 
young and old, or rough differences were established in the contributions according to 
age group, but not calculated in a scientific manner.  One of the keys to their success 
was the confidence that members had in their society. Consequently, it was normally 
preferred to limit the number of members per society in order to guarantee their 
individual control and to facilitate inspection services. The average size of friendly 
societies in Spain ranged between 100 and 250 members. In general, three basic 
requirements were necessary in order to become a member: to be presented by two or 
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more members of the society, in order to ensure a selective recruitment, to pass a 
medical check-up with the society’s doctor and not to be over a maximum age of around 
40-45 years old. Some societies also charged a small entrance fee as a guarantee of the 
saving capacity of the member.  
Once the application was accepted, members were committed to paying a 
monthly contribution, either standard or proportional to age, although there was a 
qualifying period of around three months before new members started to enjoy full 
rights. In some cases, members could pay an extra fee in order to extend the social 
cover to their immediate family. In the situations precribed by internal regulations, 
society members provided aid and mutual support to affected members with the money 
of the reserve fund. The most common support mechanisms consisted in the granting of 
a modest cash benefit or in covering medical and/or pharmaceutical requirements during 
a limited period of time of less than three months a year. 
The rather poor statistics available seem to show that the number of mutual insurance 
associations in Spain increased from 1,274 in 1915 to 1,770 in 1925, providing cover 
for 143,993 and 398.999 members respectively.33 The majority of mutual societies 
offered sickness risk coverage (35.3 per cent in 1915 and 36.6 per cent in 1925), 
followed by coverage for death and disability (Table 2).34 From a geographical point of 
view, the distribution of these societies was very unequal, being concentrated above all 
in the more industrialised regions with a greater weight of urban population and wage-
earners (Catalonia, the Basque Country, Madrid and Valencia). In 1925, the resources 
of insurance mutuals were used to provide cash benefits for sickness (75 per cent), 
pharmaceutical aid (15 per cent) and medical attention (10 per cent). Generally 
speaking, these associations made agreements for health care and pharmaceutical 
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provision with clinics, hospitals or private sanatoriums, although there were still many 
others which could not even count on the services of a private doctor of their own. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of insured in Mutual Societies according to risks covered 
 
Benefit contracted 1915 1920 1925 
Sickness cash benefit  35.25% 36.70% 36.56% 
Medical and pharmaceutical attention 17.98% 15.69% 13.51% 
Death expenses 19.02% 21.86% 22.65% 
Disability 12.30% 12.22% 11.86% 
Funeral expenses 7.58% 5.75% 7.41% 
Maternity 1.12% 1.33% 1.47% 
Old age 3.08% 2.49% 2.72% 
Widowhood and Orphanhood 2.94% 1.72% 1.52% 
Others 0.73% 2.25% 2.30% 
Total 435,123 798,744 1,048,027 
Source: INP, La cuestión del seguro de enfermedad, p. 101. 
 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, a debate took place in Spain 
between the representatives of the friendly societies and the state, above all in the area 
of health care. The National Conference of Sickness, Disability and Maternity 
Insurance, held in Barcelona in 1922 served as a forum for the friendly societies to set 
out their legal and economic claims.35 One of their main complaints was in relation to 
their lack of legislative protection. In contrast to other European countries, where 
friendly societies benefited from specific legislation, workers’ mutuals in Spain 
continued functioning under the generic Law of Associations of 1887. In order to solve 
this problem, an ambitious preliminary draft law was presented. It contained 30 articles 
which pursued two fundamental objectives: to constitute a more solid legal framework 
for their operations and to guarantee their active participation in the incipient system of 
state welfare. 
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The text defined a friendly society as a jointly held non-profit insurance entity in 
which all of the members enjoyed equal rights and had equal obligations. The aim was 
to provide mutual aid  including benefits in cash or kind, paid over a period of time or 
as a lump sum, with the aim of covering the risk of sickness, disability, old age, death, 
forced unemployment, widowhood and orphanhood or other similar risks. The text laid 
down the conditions required for the constitution, functioning and dissolution of such 
societies, as well as establishing some basic statutory principles of a compulsory nature. 
Furthermore, the document proposed a new mutual organisational structure through the 
creation of a general register of societies, compulsory provincial federation, which 
would act as an intermediate body, and a governing body (Consejo Superior) of friendly 
societies headed by the Ministry of Labour or by the President of the National Welfare 
Institute. In the document’s conclusions, the friendly societies demanded recognition of 
their legitimacy to participate actively in the administration of the future compulsory 
social insurances which were the theme of the Conference. The proposals rested on two 
principal factors: the friendly societies’ long experience in covering risks and their 
capacity to act as a link between the state and workers.36 However, both the presentation 
of the preliminary draft law by the representatives of the friendly societies and its 
reception by the state were full of contradictions. The former showed their readiness to 
collaborate with the policy of public welfare but rejected state control of their activities. 
The state, for its part, publicly acknowledged the important work carried out by the 
workers’ friendly societies in sickness coverage, but then went on to completely ignore 
their demands through a combination of legislative inaction and an absence of 
information.  
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In spite of this failure, the friendly societies continued to maintain their share of 
the market because their main speciality, sickness coverage, was still not provided 
either by the state or by private insurance companies. Later, the Spanish government 
defended the need to introduce state sickness insurance of a compulsory nature in the 
International Conference on sickness insurance held in Geneva in 1927.37 At the same 
time, the Spanish government’s representatives at this conference justified the absence 
of such insurance in Spain on the basis of two arguments. On the one hand, they pointed 
out that the majority of Spanish wage-earners had sickness risk covered through a 
friendly society or a private insurance company (an over-optimistic vision in view of the 
reality of the country). On the other hand, the Spanish delegation was of the opinion that 
the sector of the population that lacked resources and possessed an official certificate of 
poverty38 could request the medical and pharmaceutical services offered by public 
charity. The official report noted that just in domiciliary care, municipal charity 
guaranteed the free provision of medical and pharmaceutical services to 595,132 
families in 1925. Finally, the system of igualas had spread throughout the whole country 
among the common people who could neither afford insurance nor benefit from 
charity.39 Using these arguments, the government announced that a state sickness 
insurance “would cost the state a great deal of money and would have very little 
guarantee of success”. In line with this philosophy, state responsibility was limited to 
protecting the public against any abuses or fraud committed by the different funds or 
societies providing private insurance, whether in terms of health care provision or of an 
economic nature.40 
But by the late 1920s the decline of the friendly societies in Spain was evident, and 
this became irreversible in the 1930s. Various factors contributed to this demise. 
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Compulsory insurance in Spain received a considerable boost during the Primo de 
Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930), specifically old age and maternity cover. This process 
reduced the scope of activity of insurance mutuals, which then specialised more in 
providing sickness coverage. Meanwhile, the internal cost structure of the friendly 
societies underwent important changes in the decades prior to the introduction of 
compulsory sickness insurance during the Franco regime (1939-1975). Sickness and 
death benefits lost weight in the total annual expenditure due to the increase of 
personnel costs and, above all, medical fees. By way of example, the evolution of the 
expenses of the friendly society known as Montepío de La Caridad (1857-1951) can be 
seen (Table 3).41 From 1901 to 1919 the largest share of expenses was destined to 
sickness benefits and medical fees, which comprised almost 70 per cent of the total.42 
However, these benefits remained unchanged in the long term, as there was no 
important increase in the daily rate, and they ended up losing weight in the society’s 
total expenditure. By the 1940s these benefits only comprised between 10 and 15 per 
cent of expenses. Medical fees, on the other hand, which only constituted a third of 
expenses at the start of the century, were in excess of 50 per cent by the 1930s and went 
on to reach almost 60 per cent of total expenditure in the 1940s, before their elimination 
in 1947. This increase was partly due to the incorporation of specialists, as the service 
of midwives and dentists was added during the 1920s. Nevertheless, maternity cover 
was eliminated with the introduction of compulsory maternity insurance in 1931.  The 
cost of medical fees went up during the Second Republic and especially during the early 
postwar years, when medical associations approved substantial salary increases. These 
pay rises coincided with the passage of the law of compulsory insurance which finally 
brought an end to the provision of medical services in most friendly societies. On the 
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other hand, in spite of the fact that it is not perceptible in an analysis of expenses of the 
societies studied, there are reliable sources which indicate that during these years the 
medical advances and the application of new treatments and medicines (sulphonamides, 
etc.) pushed up pharmaceutical costs, upsetting the balance sheets of the mutual 
societies.43  
 










on medicines Banks 
Other 
expenses 
1901 5.05 42.87 4.21 39.50 5.05 0 0 3.28 
1903 6.07 38.20 0 41.65 6.07 0 0 7.99 
1911 7.37 43.76 8.60 31.77 5.90 0 0.85 1.72 
1915 6.19 22.58 8.26 30.40 4.95 6.15 19.42 2.01 
1916 6.53 27.16 4.35 34.37 5.22 10.92 8.82 2.59 
1918 4.13 44.34 8.95 27.39 3.30 7.51 0 4.35 
1919 5.62 29.91 7.49 41.78 4.49 7.03 0 3.65 
1920 4.96 31.92 2.76 49.02 4.02 4.32 0 2.96 
1923 4.39 19.38 4.27 58.73 4.16 7.66 0 1.37 
1924 4.29 20.00 1.19 64.02 4.64 4.80 0 1.03 
1927 4.09 15.90 3.41 63.60 0 3.63 7.59 1.75 
1929 4.61 10.75 4.48 63.74 0.58 3.70 10.99 1.12 
1930 4.93 13.20 4.79 62.30 0.51 3.74 8.99 1.50 
1931 5.45 17.07 2.27 60.85 1.57 4.41 7.47 0.87 
1932 5.28 17.85 4.40 58.76 2.03 3.38 7.35 0.91 
1934 5.65 19.30 3.92 60.74 4.70 3.46 0 2.20 
1935 6.04 15.15 2.51 61.64 1.32 2.67 5.18 5.45 
1936 6.33 21.40 5.27 54.22 1.56 3.51 2.34 5.34 
1937 7.94 10.44 3.33 60.25 1.93 4.36 5.00 6.70 
1938 7.78 11.45 6.49 57.89 2.34 2.66 8.66 2.70 
1939 8.30 14.39 2.30 60.06 2.29 5.70 3.46 3.46 
1940 8.26 11.00 4.59 59.71 1.86 4.13 2.87 7.55 
1941 7.11 14.02 2.87 47.83 7.36 12.91 4.59 3.28 
1942 11.26 13.72 4.38 58.87 4.38 3.40 0 3.96 
1943 11.92 10.01 0.82 65.29 5.36 4.47 0 2.09 
1944 11.03 20.14 2.29 50.02 5.73 5.44 0 5.31 
1945 13.74 16.02 2.86 53.20 7.22 4.02 0 2.90 
1946 13.97 14.93 2.91 50.67 8.21 7.51 0 1.77 
1947 14.21 30.29 0.98 28.33 8.49 5.42 0 12.24 
1948 24.98 48.70 0 8.08 14.41 0 0 3.80 
1949 15.77 68.20 4.38 0 8.63 0 0 3.00 
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1950 25.96 48.64 5.40 0 12.98 0 0 6.99 
Source: Archivo del Reino de Mallorca, lligall 1609/expediente 1100. 
 
It was not easy for societies which had two historical weaknesses to confront the 
serious financial deterioration.44 One of these weaknesses was that the financial 
autonomy arising from the modest contributions paid by members resulted in a limited 
capacity of coverage in the face of uncertainty, both in qualitative terms (the type of 
risk) and quantitatively (the value and duration of the benefit). Friendly society finances 
proceeding from the contributions of patrons, supporting members and employers 
barely reached, on average, 5.83 per cent of the common reserve fund in 1925.45 The 
state, for its part, only granted a small number of subsidies to mutual societies which 
applied for one, but the limited quantity of this aid rules out the idea of a system of 
health care provision that was privately managed but subsidised by the state.46 On the 
other hand, mutual insurance proved to be extremely vulnerable from three points of 
view: very little diversification of risk (they usually insured workers from the same 
occupation), an absence of actuarial techniques (lack of studies of the morbidity rate or 
mortality tables for the calculation of premiums) and extreme sensitivity to economic 
cycles (the common reserve fund went down with increased unemployment or pay 
cuts). Aware of their weaknesses, the friendly societies had established strict selection 
processes for their members and severe behaviour codes were imposed in order to 
continue as a member.47  
However, in the 1920s and 1930s the friendly societies ran into great difficulties to 
cover the generational change. The lack of new young members resulted in insufficient 
revenue to cover the needs of elderly members, those who most needed medical and 
pharmaceutical attention. The improved living conditions of the population led young 
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people to feel less need to subscribe to a mutual. Young people preferred to start using 
savings books issued by savings banks as a precautionary measure against any future 
contingency, encouraged by the deliberate policy of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship of 
promoting savings.48 Furthermore, they considered that it was just a matter of time 
before the arrival of a state sickness insurance, following in the footsteps of old age and 
maternity cover, and that this would leave the friendly societies without any clear role. 
The drop in affiliation aggravated the financial imbalances and depreciated the cash 
benefits offered. 
The situation of the workers’ mutuals was further aggravated by the growing 
competition from other forms of voluntary protection such as the private insurance 
companies, employers’ mutuals, and multiple trade unions.49 The first two varieties 
have already been dealt with in the previous section. With regard to the introduction of 
the multiple base system, this entailed the extension of the trade unions’ sphere of 
activity from the traditional struggle over pay and working conditions to the 
establishment of some of the types of assistance (sickness, unemployment, disability, 
etc.) typical of friendly societies.50 Under this system, trade union contributions from 
the affiliated opened the door to two types of cover, which were distributed equally: the 
caja de resistencia (resistance fund) and the caja de socorro (relief fund). The trade 
union offered a resistance fund bonus and the defence of workers’ rights, although 
always with a clear ideological commitment and limited benefits.  
The incorporation of the concept of the multiple base in the organisational system of 
trade unions started to be debated in Madrid in 1906, coinciding with the unemployment  
crisis and the drop in affiliation being experienced by the workers’ societies and the 
UGT (General Union of Workers).51 The multiple base was fully applied for the first 
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time in the Madrid printing union known as El Arte de Imprimir, birthplace of socialist 
trade unionism, in 1908. Some years later, in 1918, the National Graphical Federation 
agreed to promote the new formula, which was to become reality two years later. Other 
trade unions of different ideologies (including of Catholic ideology) followed suit, 
although not without problems, as the multiple base created some reserves among 
members as it increased trade union fees. According to the trade unionist philosophy, 
the member with the highest wage paid a higher fee but also received greater benefits. 
Generally speaking, unions offered the bonus of the resistance fund and the defence 
of workers’ rights, although always with a clear ideological affiliation. For their part, 
private companies could already count on a specific legal framework and a greater 
capacity of coverage and offered the guarantee of some small reserves and a 
professionalised management. In this context, what incentives did the friendly societies 
offer working class families to cover their risk of sickness? Entering into the realm of 
speculation, we can note two main factors: family tradition and geographical proximity. 
In particular, mutual solidarity had managed to extend itself among working class 
families both in rural and urban Spain during the century before the Civil War, adapting 
itself with ease to the needs of each productive activity and territory. It was even normal 
to find friendly societies comprised of a small number of members in little or scattered 
towns. The majority of the commercial companies of the sickness branch, however, 
were located in Barcelona and Madrid. Both cities together concentrated 149 of the 236 
insurance companies operating in Spain from 1912 to 1940.52 Although the private 
insurance sector in Spain modernised and rationalised between 1912 and 1935, there 
was still a long way to go in order to overcome the fragmentation and scant capital of 
these companies. For its part, the complete system of multiple base began among the 
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working class of Madrid, but it developed very slowly. The restriction of political and 
trade union liberties during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1929), in particular, 
was not favourable to the spread of this kind of coverage in Spain.  
Consequently, until at least 1936, the shortcomings in the system of state 
provision, especially in the area of sickness, and the limited and unequal regional 
development of its main competitors enabled friendly societies to maintain a share in 
the market, albeit decreasing. In view of these conclusions, it seems that the provision 
of sickness coverage by friendly societies survived in Spain at least until the Civil War, 
more due to the failings of “other means of coverage” than to the efficiency of this 
model itself. Its days, however, were numbered, as state intervention in the sphere of 
sickness seemed to be inevitable. The state, although moving slowly, had now finally 
opted for a public system of compulsory state insurances. The process had been initiated 
with the establishment of old age, maternity and industrial accident insurance and, 
therefore, it was only a matter of time for sickness insurance.  
 
THE PASSAGE OF COMPULSORY SICKNESS INSURANCE AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE 
FRIENDLY SOCIETIES (1939-1944). 
The coup d’état of July 1936 which led to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War was 
aimed at the forceful overthrow of a democratic regime in order to impose a 
dictatorship, which marked a break with the past not only in political terms but also 
socially and economically. The autarkic and interventionist growth model of the Franco 
distatorship condemned the country to a long postwar period, characterised not only by 
spectacular falls in the main economic indicators but also by an alarming step 
backwards in terms of education and welfare in a context of deprivation of human, 
social and political rights. The figures are conclusive. The 1935 income level of the 
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Spanish economy was not regained until fifteen years later and its convergence in terms 
of GDP per capita with respect to the principal European countries was reduced to an 
all-time low in 1960 (53 per cent).53  
After their victory in the Civil War, Francoists also established a regime of social 
coverage which fitted in perfectly with their ideology.54 The dictator did not intend to 
use social policies as a way of improving the population’s welfare or redistributing 
income more equitably. Quite the opposite, social insurances comprised part of a 
broader political strategy. On the one hand, the Francoist regime’s social insurances 
served to reduce social tensions in a context of repression and terrible living conditions. 
On the other hand, these social provisions served the dictatorial regime as a propaganda 
tool, as they allowed the authorities to present a friendlier face to workers who were 
subjected to tough working conditions and a lack of liberties. Within this model, the 
main source of financing social insurances was through companies’ and workers’ 
contributions, while the state’s participation was almost a token gesture. Consequently, 
benefits remained very low and were few and far between. Sickness insurance became 
one of the cornerstones of the dictatorship’s social propaganda in a Spain where hunger 
was still rife and a climate of fear and repression reigned. 
There exists a cause-effect relationship between the way the sickness insurance 
was implemented during the first stage of the Franco regime and the disappearance of 
the friendly societies. These were organisations which had emerged, in most cases, 
among the working classes and the fascist Francoist dictatorship installed after the 
Spanish Civil War tried to favour other pressure groups involved in sickness insurance, 
especially employers and professional organisations. In fact, these two social groups, 
employers and workers, represented both sides of the social divide that existed in the 
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post-Civil War period in Spain. The employers, representatives of the winning side, 
were able to benefit from the support and sympathy of the regime. The workers, linked 
to the losing side, remained outside the circles of influence while at the same time they 
were subject to a hostile labour environment which deprived them of all possible ways 
of defending their civil rights and maintaining decent living conditions. We shall take a 
look at how the process developed. 
After years of debates, the government of the Franco dictatorship finally introduced 
compulsory sickness insurance. Like the entire system of social welfare in force during 
the post-Civil War period, compulsory sickness insurance served the dictatorial regime 
as a tool for applying its repressive regime and for exerting control over the workers.55 
At the same time, this insurance comprised part of the paternalistic social propaganda 
that the regime tried to exploit as a way of legitimising its power and eliminating any 
social or labour tensions and disputes.56  
Although the dictator concentrated all power in his hands, in practice he delegated 
decision making to the heads of different departments, controlled by the numerous 
“political families” of the regime (military officers, Falangists, monarchists, Catholics 
and technocrats) which struggled to gain a greater share of power. Internal disputes 
gave rise to the existence of inconsistencies and difficulties of coordination in different 
areas57. In particular, control of public health care during the Franco regime was in the 
hands of two principal factions. On the one hand, the National Catholic group controlled 
the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio de Gobernación) and the Directorate General for 
Health. On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour and the bodies responsible for the 
management of different types of insurance such as the National Welfare Institute were 
in the hands of the Falange Española de las J.O.N.S., the official fascist party. The 
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compulsory sickness insurance was promoted by this latter group and comprised part of 
their social policy.  
The social aspect constituted one of the main pillars supporting the national 
syndicalist ideology. From their point of view, workers made up part of a unit in “which 
each part had to be efficacious and contribute their energies towards the aggrandisement 
of the fatherland”.  In line with this philosophy, compulsory sickness insurance was 
necessary in order to treat sick workers and reintegrate them into the “charming 
metaphysical complex which is Spain”.58 This spirit pervaded the implementation of the 
compulsory sickness insurance through the institutions controlled by the Falange. 
However, as taxation policy, necessary in order to finance the future insurance, 
remained outside their control, and also due to the exclusion of the oligarchies which 
controlled the health care structure from the Directorate General for Health, the 
insurance was born with serious financial difficulties and with a deficient health care 
infrastructure and bureaucracy.59      
  In order to implement compulsory sickness insurance, the state sought the support 
of the medical organisations, employers and insurance companies which had opposed 
its introduction for decades.60 The Francoist regime managed to neutralise the 
opposition, above all that of employers, who accepted the insurance in return for other 
privileges. Employers were compensated with an extremely harsh system of repression 
of any labour disputes, and also with the possibility of playing a part in administering 
the insurance. The medical organisations, for their part, were won over by means of the 
progressive incorporation of their doctors into the staff of the compulsory sickness 
insurance, although the old clans of health care workers remained outside this process.61  
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Finally, under the new legislation passed on 14 December 1942, “affiliated 
producers” 62 with an annual income of less than 9,000 pesetas were entitled to 
insurance. The law provided coverage for those working for an employer through health 
care provision in the event of sickness and maternity, and workers’ financial 
compensation for loss of earnings or in case of death. The insurance also covered the 
family of the insured. A further two years passed before the law was actually put into 
effect, the time which the National Welfare Institute, responsible for organising and 
managing the scheme, needed to dispose of the health care and administrative 
infrastructure required to implement the insurance.63  
In order to solve these difficulties, Franco’s government issued a decree on 2 March 
1944 allowing agreements to be established between the National Welfare Institute and 
private collaborating bodies, and on 8 March 1944 the Ministry of Labour issued an 
order stipulating the regulations for executing the decree. According to this document, 
the institutions which could apply to partake in the agreement were mutual societies, 
montepíos (similar to friendly societies), companies and igualatorios which had 
organised some kind of health care service or economic provision for its staff or for 
affiliated members in the event of sickness. Only 31 of the 228 organisations which 
signed agreements with the National Welfare Institute operated on a national scale, 
while the rest only provided coverage on a local, provincial or regional level. The 
companies which signed an agreement with the National Welfare Institute to manage 
compulsory sickness insurance included large mining and railway companies which 
already ran a medical insurance in their company and also some doctors’ associations. 
The organisations which showed the greatest interest in reaching this kind of agreement, 
however, were the employers’ industrial accident mutuals which already had an 
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infrastructure of clinics and dispensaries and agreements with hospitals, as well as a 
considerable bureaucracy for managing the insurance. They also had interest in 
continuing to exercise direct control over sick workers, as they already did over injured 
workers.64 Among the first employers’ mutuals to sign an agreement were those which 
operated on a national scale, including Mutua General de Seguros, Mutua Balear and 
Mapfre. 
The state did not integrate the friendly societies as a whole into the new health 
care system, although exceptionally some of them were incorporated on an individual 
basis. These were the most powerful montepíos and friendly societies, the majority of 
which were Catalan and linked to the textile sector, which had previously converted into 
insurance mutuals, such as the Montepío textil de Badalona, Asociación de Previsión 
Social or the Servicio Mutual Montepío de Empresas de la Industria textil de Hospitalet 
de Llobregat, Asociación de Previsión Social.65 The late intervention of the Spanish 
government in the provision of sickness coverage prolonged the survival of the friendly 
societies, which had been losing market share with the introduction of other types of 
state insurance.66 For example, the passage of maternity insurance in 1929 led to the 
abandonment of the midwife service which the friendly societies had been offering to 
women related to members since the end of the first decade of the twentieth century.67 
From when the compulsory sickness insurance was first implemented, in 1944, almost 
all friendly societies stopped offering sickness coverage, and most of them disappeared 
or were transformed into social clubs. Exceptionally, a few societies which managed to 
reach an agreement with the National Welfare Institute continued with their coverage.  
The reasons for this limited integration into the state system were basically financial 
and bureaucratic. According to the decree of 2 March 1944, the collaborating bodies 
 32
had to establish a guarantee deposit and liquidate the premiums collected on a quarterly 
basis with the National Sickness Insurance Fund. In this liquidation, they had to make 
up the difference between the percentage agreed and the premiums collected or the 
difference between the premiums paid by employers and workers, according to the 
official rate, and that of the provisions of the insurance, from which they could only 
deduct the amount corresponding to administration costs. The majority of friendly 
societies operated on a strictly local basis and it was difficult for them to achieve a 
financial balance. Low contributions, established solely to cover doctors’ costs, pay 
small benefits and cover the purchase or rental of their premises, did not allow them to 
accumulate sufficient capital for a deposit and much less to pay someone to deal with 
the enormous bureaucratic load which the compulsory sickness insurance entailed. 
Besides, many friendly societies had already entered in a downward spiral due to other 
factors mentioned above. 
The majority of friendly societies started to disappear at the time that the compulsory 
sickness insurance was implemented. Logically, the workers covered by the state 
insurance lost interest in paying an extra amount for an insurance which the state now 
provided and which cost them a significant part of their wages. This was already 
happening during the first stage of the introduction of compulsory sickness insurance 
implemented in 1944, when only primary health care was covered. After the Decree of 
26 December 1946, when the service was extended to general surgery, hospitalisation 
and a service of analysis and other diagnostic tests, contributions were further increased. 
This process was accompanied by an increase in the premium collected from employers 
and workers from 5.013 per cent of the insured’s earned income in June 1944 to the 8 
per cent it reached in January 1948.  
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Compulsory sickness insurance, therefore, was in line with the general approach of 
the regime to welfare concerns, in that the state did not finance the provision but merely 
acted as a manager, controlling the application of the law. In the case of sickness 
insurance, even part of the management of the insurance was handed over to avoid 
expense for the state. The insured themselves and employers financed the bureaucracy 
which resulted from the management of the insurance, as a percentage of the premium 
was deducted to cover health care inspection and the creation of hospitals in accordance 
with the Health Care Facilities Plan, which led to the creation of large hospitals, known 
as ”residencias sanitarias”, throughout the country.68 The distribution of the financial 
burden of the insurance between workers and employers was naturally very unequal in a 
context of extremely low labour costs. Consequently, the worker made a greater 
economic effort than the employer.69  
Nevertheless, the first years of the implementation of compulsory sickness insurance 
did not entail a significant change in the possibility of health care coverage for the 
majority of the Spanish population. In reality, it went on to cover the same group, 
industrial wage earners, as had already had the possibility of coverage through friendly 
societies or other market mechanisms. Thus, an important segment of the Spanish 
population remained without health care provision, above all agricultural labourers and 
the self-employed. In 1944, the beneficiaries of compulsory sickness insurance only 
comprised 25 per cent of the Spanish population, a percentage which slowly grew but 
had still not reached 30 per cent by 1950. In 1950, agricultural labourers comprised 47.6 
per cent of the country’s working population.70 The passage of compulsory sickness 
insurance was the final blow to the friendly societies whose decline had begun back in 
the 1920s and 1930s. Some did away with their service of medical attention, maintained 
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sickness and death benefits and languished for a time, continuing to provide a social and 
recreational function.71 The majority, however, sold off their assets (usually their head 
office) and went into liquidation. 
 In the 1950s, after a decade of isolation during the autarkic period, the Franco 
government tried to establish closer relations with some Latin American countries on 
the pretext of exporting its social insurance model in order to recover its lost role of 
“Madre Patria de la hispanidad” (“Mother Country of Spanishness”), an idea which 
constituted part of the dictatorial regime’s philosophy. Latin American social security 
congresses started being held in this context. The first was held in Madrid in 1951 and 
the second in Lima in 1954. During this second congress it was agreed to create the 
Latin American Social Security Organisation with its headquarters in Madrid. Its first 
president was Carlos Martí Bufill, technical secretary general of the Spanish National 
Welfare Institute and an expert in Latin American social insurances.72 Parallel to this, 
courses for the training of Social Security technicians were offered periodically. These 
courses were run by Spanish civil servants and they fostered visits by top civil servants 
and other political figures from Latin America.73 Contacts were made mainly with Peru, 
Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador, countries which endured dictatorial regimes similar to 
Spain’s, a fact that favoured closer political ties. These countries comprised part of the 
second wave of South American states that introduced their social insurance 
programmes during the 1940s and 1950s, after the pioneer group composed of Chile, 
Uruguay, Argentina, Cuba and Brazil.74 Collaboration between both sides of the 





Sickness risk coverage was one of the main concerns of working-class families at the 
beginnings of industrialisation. The first models of protection were promoted by 
workers by means of friendly societies. Later, the development of private insurance 
companies opened the way to new means of health care cover. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, European states started to implement state systems of health care 
provision with different characteristics. Some governments incorporated the friendly 
societies into their welfare programmes while others ignored them. In the latter case 
they only had two options for survival, becoming commercial insurance companies or 
abandoning health care provision and continuing basically in a recreational capacity. 
Unlike in Europe, in the United States the efficient functioning of health care provision 
through private organisations and the pressure of this lobby in social, political and 
economic circles made state intervention more difficult in this area.  
 As far as sickness insurance is concerned, the Spanish case was more akin to the 
American model than to the European one prior to the Civil War. During this period the 
state did not legislate, or regulate or finance health care provision, which remained in 
the hands of mutual societies and private companies. However, unlike the United States, 
while in Spain state passivity did not satisfy the health care demands of the population, 
it was certainly not a response to the existence of an efficient private system. On the one 
hand, the Spanish mutuals, financed exclusively through the small contributions of their 
members, ran into serious imbalances in their accounts in the 1920s and 1930s, 
especially due to the rise in price of medical fees and medicines. On the other hand, 
private insurance companies had two serious problems, the backwardness of actuarial 
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techniques and the scant requirements of the sickness branch for capital, reserves and 
deposits which put a brake on the capitalisation of companies and their concentration. 
The deficient functioning of the private sector and the influence of European models, 
which Spanish governments had already followed in providing cover for old age, 
unemployment or maternity, ended up forcing the introduction of a state sickness 
insurance. However, in contrast to democratic Europe, in Spain it was a dictatorial 
government, unfavourable for the workers, which laid the foundations of the system, a 
fact which conditioned its basic characteristics. The same as in other areas, the Franco 
dictatorship laid the cost of the insurance with the workers, who earned very low wages, 
while at the same time it used the private sector to save itself the expense of 
management and facilities. Nevertheless, this system of private management based on 
contributions left an uneven outcome. In 1950, only 30 per cent of the Spanish 
population was covered by compulsory sickness insurance, while the rural population, 
which comprised 50 per cent of the entire population, was still excluded. On the other 
hand, the majority of the collaborating bodies of the compulsory sickness insurance had 
deficits, given that premiums had more to do with political decisions than actuarial 
criteria, and because part of the premiums had to be deducted for the National Health 
Care Facilities Plan and to maintain the health care inspection service . Furthermore, the 
private management of compulsory sickness insurance resulted in a great regional 
imbalance in health care infrastructure. Finally, political changes in the regime itself 
and the need to improve the cover of the majority of the population led to the passage of 
the Law of Social Security in 1963, which entailed direct state management of this 
insurance. The majority of the friendly societies, which had been the most viable option 
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for workers before the Civil War, disappeared along the way. Only a few integrated, 
while others languished in time, devoid of their initial function.  
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